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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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State territory. It could also be expected that5 in the event of such an
action^, the Government might be overthrown by the Polish people and a
new one created in Underground Poland. The opinion inside the
oppressed country was unanimous in this respect. It clearly stated " no
concessions to the territorial claims of the Soviets." The Underground
had authorised its Government in London to offer the advancing Red
Army the support of the Home Army, a support which Moscow was so
anxious to receiveóbut there the concession ended. A Statement on
this subject was issued on January 15., 19443 by the Political Home
Representation, which declared:
" In the Note of April 25, 1943, the Soviets severed diplomatic relations
with Polandj giving as their reason the supposedly perverse attitude of the
Polish Government over the Katyn affair. It was obvious to everyone that
this was merely used by the Soviets as the pretest for a break-up of relations
with Poland. Their object was to continue the campaign against Poland,,
the plan being to force her and her Allies into agreeing with their annexation
of the Eastern provinces of the Polish Republic and to compel them to
recognise the actions they had already carried out against the hundreds of
thousands of Polish citizens deported from her Eastern territories and sent
to Russia to be deprived of the rights of Polish citizenship and forcibly
enlisted into the Russian Army.
" The Polish Political Home Representation states that the country is in
complete unison with the attitude of the Polish Government over the
conflict with the Soviets. The entire Polish people stand immovable over
the question of the integrity of Polish territory, to defend which they had
arisen in 1939. The Polish people, the first to stand up against and fight
the Hitlerian storm, are constantly resisting the invader and are continually
waging the struggle, sacrificing the life and substance of millions of their
sons. And this struggle is being waged in order to restore the Polish State
in its entirety.
" The Polish peopls understand the reasons for the policy of the Polish
Government and their efforts to maintain good relations with Soviet Russia.
But these relations must be founded on the full esteem of the integrity of
Polish territory and the interests of the Polish people ..."
The Political Representation had nothing to add to this Statement
in February. Mikolajczyk* attempted to seek a compromise on his own
account, and decided to take a step which led him beyond the concessions
towards Russia authorised by the Underground. The idea of " preserving
the Polish Government's place among the United Nations " was chiefly
* Mikolajczyk was the representative of the Peasants Party (the leaders of which
had remained in Poland) in Sikorski's Cabinet and after the latter's death he became
Prime Minister in the summer of 1944. Mikolajczyk followed Sikorski's foreign
policy and sought a compromise with Russia at a. cost and sacrifice, which even
Sikorski and certainly his opposition had considered to be out of the question.
The Kremlin, who was opposed to any strong character holding the reins in the
Polish Government or as head of the Army, was willing to agree that Mikolajczyk
was the * right man in the right place * and one with whom they might conclude an
agreement. This unusual consideration displayed by Moscow towards the head
of another government was to go a step further when in^order to play hiin off
against his own Government they offered him the position of Premier in the
<cPolish" government composed from their agents.